The global trading system is moving into an increasingly harsh and fragmented era. Tariff wars, industrial policy, and geopolitical rivalry are pushing major powers to rebuild their own economic blocs. In such a world, a region without a center of gravity becomes little more than a market—easy to pressure, easy to divide, and easy to exploit. ASEAN now stands at precisely this crossroads. And within ASEAN, there is only one country with the economic scale, political weight, and strategic position to prevent the region from sliding toward the margins of the global economy: Indonesia.

ASEAN is, in many ways, a miniature version of the WTO. It brings together advanced economies, emerging markets, developing countries, and the most vulnerable. If ASEAN can maintain unity and articulate common positions, it can do more than merely survive; it can help shape the reform of the global trading system. But that is only possible if there is strong political leadership within ASEAN.

The twin dangers of fragmentation and technocratic drift
Unfortunately, in recent years ASEAN has faced two parallel threats. First is the growing tendency of member states to pursue competing bilateral deals that weaken the region’s collective production base. Second is the gradual shift of ASEAN’s center of gravity away from political leadership toward technocratic management by its Secretariat—a form of “technocratic drift” where bureaucracy displaces strategic direction. Economic integration cannot live on roadmaps and reports alone; it is sustained by political decisions about industrial and trade priorities.

If this trajectory continues, ASEAN risks what might be called “de-industrialization by neglect”: integrated on paper, but sidelined in the emerging global production map. Why, then, must Indonesia step forward again? As ASEAN’s largest economy and one of its founding members, Indonesia is the region’s anchor. Without Indonesia, ASEAN loses its political gravity. Without Indonesia, the region becomes far easier to fracture under external pressure and narrow national interests. Yet for too long Indonesia has treated ASEAN as just one of many channels of economic diplomacy, while policy attention has shifted toward bilateral deals. In a fragmented world, this approach weakens Indonesia’s own strategic position.

This leadership vacuum is especially dangerous at a time when geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia is intensifying. The United States, China, Japan, and Europe no longer view ASEAN as a neutral forum, but as a contested arena for economic influence, technological standards, and industrial positioning. When ASEAN fails to speak with one voice, external powers can easily pull the region into competing bilateral orbits—Vietnam in one direction, the Philippines in another, Thailand and Malaysia along different axes—while Indonesia risks becoming just another drifting player instead of the anchor it should be.

This is where the distinction between chairmanship and leadership becomes critical. The ASEAN Secretariat can organize meetings and draft blueprints, but only a country with Indonesia’s economic and political weight can set strategic direction. Without Indonesian leadership, ASEAN will continue to drift on bureaucratic inertia rather than move with purpose, while its members seek shelter under the bilateral umbrellas of major powers. In a fragmented world, this weakens not only ASEAN, but also Indonesia’s own bargaining power.

Indonesia must therefore restore ASEAN as the central anchor of its trade and industrial strategy. This requires three concrete steps. First, ASEAN must be elevated back to the highest political level: supply chains, strategic industries, and digital transformation must become priorities for presidents and economic ministers within an ASEAN framework, not merely technical discussions managed by the Secretariat. Second, Indonesia must lead the shaping of regional value chains, steering ASEAN toward complementary specialization rather than destructive competition in strategic sectors such as energy, new-energy vehicles, electronics, and the digital economy. Third, the Secretariat must return to its proper role as a facilitator of political decisions by member states—not the de facto architect of regional policy.
 

In a world increasingly defined by great-power rivalry, Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN is not a matter of regional pride. It is an instrument of economic power. Without a cohesive ASEAN, Indonesia faces the pressure of major blocs alone; with a solid ASEAN, Indonesia can negotiate from a position of strength. That is why the next question becomes decisive: what does ASEAN actually mean for Indonesia’s strategic interests?

2026: Drift or lead
The year 2026 will be a turning point. ASEAN can either remain a relevant actor in a fragmented global economy or slide quietly into irrelevance as a collection of divided markets. All the prerequisites to prevent that outcome lie in Indonesia: economic scale, geopolitical position, and a track record of leadership. What is required now is not technocratic capacity, but political courage. Without Indonesia as its anchor and guide, ASEAN will lose its gravitational pull. With Indonesia at the helm, it can still emerge as one of the key poles of the global economy.
(To be continued in Part 2)

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Iman Pambagyo is the Trade Ministry’s Director General of International Trade Negotiations (2012-2014, 2016-2020) and Indonesia’s Ambassador to the WTO (2014-2015).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author.