Last month, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono and Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin met in Tokyo with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi as part of the bilateral 2+2 mechanism. The backdrop to these meetings is increasingly dramatic. As Indonesia’s state news agency Antara explained, this affirmation of the Japan-Indonesia relationship “takes place amid China's increasing assertiveness in asserting its position in the South China Sea as well as in the East China Sea”.

Jakarta has historically been taciturn about Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific. But the Prabowo administration is more security-minded than its predecessors. The intensification of ties with Japan makes sense in this context: Japan’s new Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi is intent on strengthening the defense capabilities of Japan and its regional partners, of which Indonesia is no exception.

On the campaign trail in 2024, then-Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto promised a renewed role for Indonesia on the international stage and, now as President, he has delivered. The nation’s voice was heard in the successful negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza last month, and despite his recent election, Prabowo already wields influence within ASEAN. Indonesia is once again punching at its weight class in international affairs. 

Indonesia’s policies in the Indo-Pacific region are also coming sharply into focus. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which Indonesia is committed to, argues for ASEAN centrality in the region with the bloc serving as a bridge builder between the superpowers, the United States and China. The strategic posture of Japan, a key outside interest but pacifist under its constitution, is most closely aligned with Indonesia through its Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP) policy. FOIP, of course, fits neatly with Indonesia’s "Free and Active" (Bebas dan Aktif) foreign policy doctrine, in place since the days of Bung Karno.  

Compared to his predecessor, Joko Widodo, Prabowo views foreign policy as much through the lens of security as trade and investment. This is unsurprising given his record of service in the Indonesian military. The military has been modernizing slowly since 2019, buying military equipment from a range of suppliers to avoid over-dependence on any one market. His administration seems to want to create space from China. That’s why it has purchased fighter jets from the US and France and accepted Japan’s donation of two brand-new 18-meter patrol vessels under Tokyo’s Official Security Assistance (OSA) initiative.

Observers expect Japan-Indonesia deals to increase soon. Japan is rapidly modernizing its Self-Defense Forces, as Indonesia would like to. Unmanned systems and the ability to hold its own in potential long-running conflicts are seen as important. As are “stand off” defense capabilities like advanced submarines with improved missile launch capabilities, known as the vertical launching system (VLS). Indonesia is certainly a potential candidate to purchase Japanese Mogami-class frigates – an emerging part of Defense Minister Koizumi’s strategy of “top-level sales diplomacy”.

Potential purchases of naval equipment are important. While the tone is measured, Indonesia has an ongoing maritime rights dispute with China over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the area known as the North Natuna Sea. The confrontation is nothing like that of China’s with the Philippines, whose waters are regularly entered by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), in contravention of international law. 

However, the dispute serves to focus the Indonesian government’s mind on the reality of economic relations with China, which uses its economic weight to get its way. Indonesian policymakers are, fundamentally, pursuing a balanced picture in the Indo-Pacific to preclude further infringements on Jakarta’s economic interests. 

Prabowo’s emerging relationship with the new White House is notable in this context. The US’s so-called “pivot to Asia” began under President Obama but faltered under the first Trump administration. From tariffs to rare earths, President Trump is the first US President intent on checking China. While Prabowo is engaging him accordingly, Japan is the more dependable, less distracted partner for ASEAN states like Indonesia. 

The bilateral relationship gained new depth via a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in September 2023. By boosting cooperation in investment, defense, and energy, the CSP builds on Japan’s status as Indonesia’s fourth-largest foreign investor, with military cooperation also expanding, which includes Japan’s participation in the Super Garuda Shield exercise hosted by Indonesia in 2024. 

We can expect more such exercises in the years ahead. If the US executes on its longstanding pledge to pivot to the Indo-Pacific, then Indonesia will come under increasing pressure to move away from its Free and Active policy. Both the US and China will want Indonesia, a nation of more than 270 million, to be in “their camp”. 

Indonesia will resist, as is its prerogative. The archipelago nation has in the AOIP and FOIP, with their strong degree of overlap, a path forward away from unmitigated confrontation to a future based on security, openness, and the ultimate protection of each affected nations’ sovereignty. ASEAN capitals must pick their partners wisely to achieve this future. 

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Joseph Hammond is a journalist and former Fulbright Public Policy fellow, with bylines in Newsweek, The Washington Post, Forbes.com, and more.

The opinions presented in this article are solely those of the author.