At the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia's Middle Powers Strategic Dialogue on 14 April, one theme stood out above the rest: the global order is not simply shifting but transitioning and even splintering in dramatic ways. As major powers (principally the US and China) compete more openly across economic, technological, and security domains, the space between them is growing wider. That space is where middle powers like Indonesia, Japan, Australia, and Canada must now operate with far greater intention.

The critical question is not if middle-powers matter. Rather, the real question is what role they can play in helping create outcomes versus reacting to outcomes. The answer lies not only in expanded alliance networks, but in fluid, rule-of-law-based cooperative arrangements built upon openness -- an example of which exists within the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework. 

Indonesia is not debating this concept abstractly. As the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a strategic fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific oceans, Indonesia is situated at the crossroads of strategic competition. Moreover, Jakarta is faced with a dual challenge: maintaining its long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy, while simultaneously keeping its economic and security environment as stable, as predictable, and as open as possible. 

The FOIP framework, first put forward by Japan, provides a model that Indonesia can use. Not as a formally structured alliance or externally imposed doctrine, but as a cohesive set of principles. Freedom of navigation, respect for international law, open markets, and inclusive connectivity are not concepts forced upon Indonesia by outsiders. Rather, these concepts are reflective of Indonesia's own interests as an archipelago state dependent upon secure sea lanes and diverse trading partners. 

The relevance of FOIP to middle powers stems from its flexibility. It does not require countries to select one partner over another exclusively. Instead, it allows countries to participate in small, purpose-driven partnerships that can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. Japan's recent trilateral naval exercises with India and Indonesia provide examples of how this type of cooperation can improve maritime security without requiring countries to form rigid alliances. These types of arrangements are not traditional alliances. Instead, they are practical collaborations that enhance capacity building and trust. 

In addition to the ability to establish flexible cooperative arrangements, middle powers provide something distinctive: credibility. Due to their lack of coercion and predictability relative to great powers, middle powers serve as bridges connecting regions, facilitating dialogue and stabilizing tensions. While Indonesia has served in this capacity through ASEAN for years, the present environment necessitates that such efforts expand well beyond existing regional frameworks. 

From a Canadian perspective, this shift is equally urgent. Increasingly, Canada recognizes the Indo-Pacific region as being critical to its economic and strategic future. To achieve this goal, Canada seeks to diversify trade, strengthen resilient supply chains, and develop relations with Southeast Asia. Such efforts are not desirable but essential when viewed through a partnership lens. 

Canada’s approach mirrors many of the same principles: support for open markets; compliance with international law; commitment to inclusive growth. Drawing on the FOIP framework, Canada is investing in a networked approach, building relationships across the region, supporting capacity development, and contributing to a stable, rules-based system. 

This convergence of interests provides a genuine opportunity. Indonesia and Canada -- alongside other middle powers can work together to reinforce systems under strain -- including not only security cooperation but also economic integration, digital governance, and infrastructure development. Open systems -- in trade, technology, and maritime access -- are the lifeblood of middle-power prosperity. 

However, openness cannot be taken for granted; it must be actively defended. Therefore, middle powers must move beyond rhetoric. Investments in maritime domain awareness, joint exercises, and defense industrial cooperation are indicators of a clear-eyed recognition that stability requires capability. 

While economic openness must be paired with resilience, the pandemic and recent disruptions in global supply chains made plain the risks associated with over-concentration. Diversification amongst a variety of open and rules-based partners is not only a good economic strategy - it is a security imperative. For Indonesia, that means continuing to attract investment while expanding trading partnerships. For Canada, that means deepening engagement across Southeast Asia through targeted agreements and investments. 

Middle powers able to build networks, uphold rules, and keep systems open will be best positioned to navigate the uncertainty ahead. Therefore, Indonesia has an opportunity to lead, not by abandoning its independent foreign policy but by proactively shaping the environment in which that independence is exercised. 

By engaging with frameworks such as FOIP on their own terms, Indonesia can help create a regional order that is open, inclusive, and grounded in rules rather than coercion. Similarly for Canada and others -- the message is the same: the future of the Indo-Pacific will not be decided simply in Washington or Beijing -- it will be defined in Jakarta-Tokyo-Canberra-and-beyond too. Working together, middle powers have both the standing and the capacity to ensure that the future is defined by cooperation rather than coercion.

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Jonathan Berkshire Miller is the principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory and a senior fellow at the Ottawa-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.