Over the past few years, international trade has increasingly been discussed in the language of security rather than economics. Tariffs, subsidies, supply chains, critical minerals, and even electric vehicles are no longer treated merely as trade issues; they have become instruments of geopolitics.

On the one hand, there is a growing ambition to reshape the global trading order around new priorities such as resilience, sustainability, and strategic autonomy. On the other hand, there is a rising concern that these same efforts may accelerate the fragmentation of the global economy.

This tension was evident during a series of discussions in Brussels and Berlin recently that brought together policymakers, business representatives, and experts from Europe, Asia, and Africa. What emerged was a striking contrast. Brussels increasingly views the world through a geopolitical lens, while Berlin continues to approach many trade challenges through a geo-economic one. How Europe reconciles these two perspectives may help shape the future of the global trading system.

Brussels and Berlin
In Brussels, the administrative heart of the European Union, there remains considerable confidence in Europe's ability to shape global trade through its regulatory influence. Instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), digital trade rules, and intellectual property protections are often perceived beyond Europe not merely as regulatory tools, but as mechanisms for exporting European standards on trade, sustainability, and governance. The challenge for Europe is no longer its ability to set standards, but its ability to secure broad acceptance of them.

Yet behind this regulatory agenda lies a growing geopolitical imperative. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and rising strategic competition with China have profoundly influenced policy thinking in Europe. Relations with the United States are increasingly viewed not merely as an economic partnership but as part of a broader strategic alignment.

At the same time, many policy discussions in Brussels appear trapped between diagnosis and prescription. Concerns about technological competition with China, industrial decline, and economic security are widely acknowledged. However, clear and practical solutions are less apparent.

Berlin presents a different picture. Germany's policymakers, businesses, and research institutions tend to approach these challenges from a more pragmatic perspective. The central questions are not how to position Germany in a geopolitical contest, but how to preserve industrial competitiveness, maintain integrated supply chains, and avoid large-scale job losses.

There is also a growing recognition that some of Germany's current concerns stem from its own earlier choices. For years, German companies benefited from China's vast domestic market while using the country as a platform for global expansion.

During that period, China was not standing still. It steadily upgraded its technological and industrial capabilities and has since emerged as a formidable competitor in sectors long dominated by Europe. The concern in Berlin today is that an increasingly confrontational approach toward China may deepen global fragmentation and ultimately undermine the competitiveness of Europe's export-oriented industries.

China as a Reality, Not a Choice
From the perspective of Southeast Asia, the debate often looks different. For ASEAN countries, China is not a policy option that can simply be accepted or rejected. It is a geographic and economic reality.

History offers many examples of rising economic powers generating anxiety among established ones. Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States after World War II, and Japan during the 1970s and 1980s all triggered concerns about economic dominance and competitive pressures. Hence, China's rise should be viewed within that broader historical context.

After four decades of sustained growth, China has become deeply integrated into global trade, investment, and manufacturing networks. Ignoring that reality will not make it disappear. The challenge is not how to deny China's rise, but how to manage its consequences.

For many countries in Asia and Africa, the most practical short-term response is diversification. Expanding export markets, broadening sources of investment, and reducing excessive dependence on any single partner remain the most effective safeguards against uncertainty.

Saving the Multilateral Trading System
Diversification, however, is only a partial answer. The longer-term challenge is preserving the multilateral trading system itself. The World Trade Organization remains weakened by institutional paralysis and growing unilateralism among major powers. Yet despite its shortcomings, it remains indispensable.

Reform is unavoidable. Existing rules must be updated to reflect new realities, including digital trade, industrial policy, and the transition toward greener economies. At the same time, waiting for full consensus among all WTO members may no longer be realistic. This is where the concept of variable geometry becomes increasingly relevant.

Countries willing to move forward should be able to negotiate plurilateral agreements in specific areas, provided those agreements remain open to others and meet a sufficient critical mass to be commercially meaningful. Such arrangements should not become exclusive clubs or instruments of geopolitical influence. Rather, they should serve as pathways toward more inclusive multilateral outcomes.

A Strategic Coalition of Europe, Asia, and Africa
All the above create an opportunity that is often overlooked. Rather than allowing the future of global trade to be defined solely by US-China rivalry, Europe, Asia, and Africa could work together to drive WTO reform and re-energize the multilateral trading system.

Together, these three regions possess significant economic weight and political influence. More importantly, they share a common interest in preserving an open, predictable, and rules-based trading environment. Such cooperation could focus on three priorities: safeguarding the WTO as the constitutional foundation of global trade, revitalizing its negotiating and monitoring functions, and strengthening compliance with agreed rules by all members.

Geopolitics has returned to center stage. Economic interdependence, however, has not disappeared. The question is no longer whether major-power rivalry can be avoided. It is whether countries outside that rivalry are willing and able to work together to preserve an open, stable, and predictable trading system. The future of the WTO -- and perhaps of the global trading system itself -- may well depend on the answer.

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Iman Pambagyo is the Trade Ministry’s Director General of International Trade Negotiations (2012-2014, 2016-2020) and Indonesia’s Ambassador to the WTO (2014-2015). The views expressed in this article are those of the author.