Jakarta. It is very rare to find a business entity like PT Danantara Sumber Daya Indonesia (DSI). The company was established as a private limited liability company on May 18, 2026. A week later, it became a state-owned enterprise after the government -- through the SOE Regulatory Agency -- acquired a 1% Series A Dwiwarna share. Its mandate is to be the sole exporter for several strategic commodities, with palm oil, coal and ferroalloys included in the scheme at the initial stage. DSI was established to strengthen economic sovereignty, solve foreign exchange proceeds leakage, and increase control over trade in strategic natural resources as mandated by the 1945 Constitution.

The move follows President Prabowo Subianto’s announcement during his presentation of the Macroeconomic Framework and Fiscal Policy Principles (KEM-PPKF) for the 2027 state budget to parliament, where he unveiled a government regulation on the governance of natural resource commodity exports. The new government regulation established an export scheme through an SOE, which is appointed as the sole exporter for several strategic commodities. The reason is that the government needs to ensure that all export transactions take place in a transparent, accountable and well-recorded manner to prevent the practice of under-invoicing, price manipulation and leakage of foreign exchange proceeds from exports.

Transition
The success of managing strategic commodities by state entities has been demonstrated by Saudi Arabia with Aramco, Malaysia with Petronas, or Chile with Codelco. As stated in the OECD Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, more countries are using centralized ownership arrangements because they are considered capable of consolidating expertise and supervision, but their effectiveness is determined by strong organizational capacity.

DSI, as a new organization, needs time to be fully operational as a "single export gateway". In the initial phase, from 1 June 2026 to August 2026, private exporters will still carry out exports as usual but are required to report and coordinate with DSI as part of the pre-clearance, clearance and post-clearance processes. Next, starting 1 September 2026, DSI's role will be expanded so that export transactions are carried out in a business-to-business scheme between the company and DSI as an export SOE. Full implementation is targeted to take place no later than early 2027, when DSI becomes the sole organization responsible for the entire export process of strategic commodities included in the scheme.

It is widely recognized that the government’s strategic oversight of natural resources serves a vital national purpose: to eliminate under-invoicing, maximize state revenues, and ensure that export foreign exchange flows directly back into the national financial system. Yet, with such a short time span between its establishment and the eventual handover of the full export responsibility, the question on many people’s mind is whether DSI is truly equipped to manage such complex global export processes.  

Moreover, Indonesia during the New Order regime has had a particularly bad experience regarding centralizing a strategic commodity. The establishment of the Clove Support and Marketing Agency (BPPC) in 1990, instead of stabilizing prices and protecting clove farmers from market fluctuations, became a symbol for monopolistic practices and the closeness between political power and the business interests of certain groups. Meanwhile, in present times, a recent OECD State Ownership and Sustainability in Indonesia (2026) report stated that many SOEs still face multiple objectives problems when business mandates and state mandates are not clearly differentiated.

Capacity Gap
The implementation of export centralization in stages until no later than early 2027 shows that the government recognizes gaps in organizational capacity before the mandate is fully implemented. This condition is known as a capacity gap, where there is a gap between policy ambition and the readiness of the implementing organization. According to Howlett, Ramesh, Wu (2015), policy success is largely determined by the balance between analytical, operational and political capacity. Quick political decisions can lose their edge when institutional capacity, human resources, operational systems and coordination mechanisms are not fully ready to carry out the large mandate they carry. This risk is very likely to increase when the burden increases faster than the available administrative capacity.

DSI's position as an export aggregator and transaction controller for various strategic commodities requires it to interact with a network of business actors, international buyers, financial institutions, logistics companies, and various ministries and supervisory institutions. The birth of the government regulation establishing DSI has shaken regulatory stability as well as investor confidence, especially regarding aspects of predictability and contractual certainty. Caution is reflected in the market response after the President's speech, which needs to be monitored closely, namely the fall in the Composite Stock Price Index (IHSG) and the free fall in the price of palm oil fresh fruit bunches (FFB) at the farmer level.

Governance risk is the next challenge. The centralization of exports in one entity has the potential to raise the risk of conflicts of interest, concentration of economic power, moral hazard, and the risk of rent and political intervention. With its large duties and authority, DSI is bound by stricter good corporate governance mechanisms, including strict audits, transaction transparency, integrated risk management, and independent supervision with its status as a SOE. Concentration of authority without strong checks and balances has the potential to create a "state corporate monopoly" that is difficult for the public to monitor. The experience of various countries shows that centralized management of strategic commodities is only successful when supported by strong governance, independent supervision, and organizational professionalism that is protected from short-term interventions.

Operationally, the centralization of exports carried out by DSI will be faced with the challenge of bureaucratic bottlenecks and delays in completing transactions when personnel placement, contract management, appointment of partners, engagement with overseas customers have not developed in proportion to the volume of transactions that must be handled. This activity will be a high-risk area for elite capture. Without mitigating this risk, DSI could change from a solution to a problem.

 DSI's success as a state entity can ultimately be seen from the two mandates it carries out simultaneously, namely, to seek profits (commercial objectives) and also to maintain the state agenda to optimize the use of strategic natural resources (public policy objectives). Independent audits, open transactions, integrated risk management, regular reporting to the public, and effective supervision are non-negotiable prerequisites. This new strategic resource export governance requires not only political will, but also adequate implementation capacity. The country's bet by positioning DSI as a "single export gateway" must not turn into a "single point of vulnerability" in the new governance of Indonesia's natural resources.

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Sidik Pramono is a lecturer at the Faculty of Administrative Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, and Managing Director of the Indonesian Institute for Public Governance (IIPG).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author.